



Gibraltar National Aviation Safety Plan

**GOVERNMENT OF GIBRALTAR
DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL AVIATION
SUITE 631, EUROPORT, GIBRALTAR**

Executive Summary

Air transport is essential to Gibraltar both economically and socially. A safe aviation system is essential for the confidence of the public, commercial users and stakeholders in the aviation industry. Maintaining and improving Gibraltar's high safety standards will be integral to this aim.

The aviation sector in Gibraltar has remained in a steady state for many years with the Director of Civil Aviation providing an adequate level of oversight for all areas not regulated by the Ministry of Defence. It is aspirational that the aviation sector will grow in Gibraltar both through the direct use of the airport and via the establishment of a well-regulated aircraft registry. As the industry is grown in a safe and sustainable way it is essential that at the same time we grow and strengthen our safety oversight capabilities to capture these new areas of responsibility.

Gibraltar recognises adequate air navigation services, airport infrastructure and safety governance systems supported by qualified personnel and resources will be essential to enabling industry growth and this plan details Gibraltar's commitment to continuously improve aviation safety management capabilities in order to reduce the risks inherent in aviation operations. This plan complements the State Safety Programme and is intended to give additional maturity to that programme. Through this plan and the State Safety Programme, Gibraltar is affirming its commitment to the ongoing improvement of aviation safety and sufficient resourcing of activities.

This plan establishes Gibraltar's safety goals, targets and indicators consistent with the International Civil Aviation Organization's Global Aviation Safety Plan and the Regional European Plan for Aviation Safety.

Signed

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'C. L. P. ...', is positioned below the 'Signed' text.

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Glossary

Abbreviations

AFRS	Airfield Fire and Rescue Services
AIP	Aeronautical Information Publication
ATS	Air Traffic Service
ATZ	Aerodrome Traffic Zone
ATC	Air Traffic Control
CFIT	Controlled Flight into Terrain
CTZ	Control Zone
DCA	Director of Civil Aviation
DfT	Department for Transport
EFOD	Electronic Filing of Differences
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
HMGGoG	His Majesty's Government of Gibraltar
HRC	High Risk Category
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
MAA	Military Aviation Authority
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
NSI	National Safety Issue
OLS	Obstacle Limitation Surface
PQ	Protocol Questions
RAF	Royal Air Force
RASP	Regional Aviation Safety Plan
RPAS	Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
SAAQ	State Aviation Activity Questionnaire
SARP	Standards and Recommended Practices
SEI	Safety Enhancement Initiative
SMS	Safety Management System
SRA	Surveillance Radar Approach
SSP	State Safety Programme
SWOT	Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat
TMA	Terminal Control Area
UK	United Kingdom
USOAP	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Overview of the NASP

- 1.1.1 The DCA is committed to enhancing aviation safety and ensuring that Gibraltar meets its international civil aviation obligations on behalf of both HMGoG and the UK. The NASP aims to support Gibraltar's Acceptable Level of Safety Performance of, **“no accidents involving commercial air transport that result in serious injuries or fatalities. No serious injuries or fatalities to third parties as a result of aviation activities.”**
- 1.1.2 A safe aviation system supports economic development of Gibraltar. The NASP will further develop the SSP in terms of oversight, risk-based management of safety, and working with other States and industry. The DCA encourages and welcomes the support of all stakeholders in achieving this.
- 1.1.3 As will be described below, the aviation systems in Gibraltar are not complex and this plan has been written to reflect this fact. The lack of complexity however in no way reduces the priority attached to all the activities conducted within Gibraltar which have an aviation safety impact.
- 1.1.4 The NASP seeks, where applicable, to align with the ICAO GASP, the European Regional Aviation Safety Plan and the UK NASP.

1.2 Structure of the NASP

- 1.2.1 The NASP for the most part follows the structure of the GASP. It sets out to detail the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders and how those stakeholders interact with and deliver the NASP. It then goes on to describe both organisational goals and operational risks which have been identified for improvement in the next three years. Introducing appropriate SEI's to assist in the progression of these goals and showing how they will be monitored through targets and indicators and subsequently updating the plan according to the outcome of monitoring activity.
- 1.2.2 Chapter 1 sets out the broad objectives of the plan, establishing responsibility for the development of the plan, its relationship with the SSP and the general operational context in which the plan is being delivered.
- 1.2.3 Chapter 2 sets out the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders that play a part in the safety of civil aviation within the aviation system in Gibraltar.
- 1.2.4 Chapter 3 sets out the purpose of the plan.
- 1.2.5 Chapter 4 details the challenges and priorities respectively confronted and agreed in the development of the plan.
- 1.2.6 Chapter 5 details the goals, targets and indicator that have been agreed in establishing this plan.
- 1.2.7 Chapter 6 discusses emerging risks.
- 1.2.8 Chapter 7 discusses safety performance measurement.

1.3 Relationship Between NASP and SSP

- 1.3.1 Gibraltar has an already established SSP that sets out the structures in place to manage operational safety risks. The NASP is intended to complement and improve the SSP by providing a focussed direction with specific goals for safety improvement, setting targets and initiatives, which will be fed back through the SSP as part of its implementation and maturation process.
- 1.3.2 The DCA recognises that the SSP is a living system that will evolve, and that the NASP forms a critical component of this process.
- 1.3.3 The DCA has drawn up this NASP by:
 - a) drawing from the Global, European Regional Safety Plan and UK safety plans
 - b) conducting extensive analysis of the safety data available within the jurisdiction and in particular through review of the mandatory and voluntary occurrence reporting schemes.
 - c) reviewing stakeholder risk register to capture risk perception beyond the immediate organisation
 - d) undertaking ICAO based training to enhance the understanding of the requirements and objectives of the NASP

1.4 Responsibility for the NASP Development, Implementation and Monitoring

- 1.4.1 The DCA is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP. The DCA is a small organisation and all of its human resource has been involved in this process.
- 1.4.2 The NASP has been developed based on the safety intelligence gathered at a local level to ensure that local risks are captured and is designed to align with the GASP.
- 1.4.3 While it is intended to progress all goals simultaneously through planned activity, the targets and indicators will undergo review every six months with updates being issued accordingly. Stakeholders will play a key role in agreeing and progressing the targets set in achieving goals.

1.5 National Safety Goals

- 1.5.1 The NASP intends to set organisational goals to improve the maturity of the SSP and operational goals to address identified areas of concern. Organisational goals are intended to improve the capability of the DCA in conducting its oversight responsibilities. Operational goals are intended to recognise and mitigate those risks which have been identified at a local level through a hazard identification/risk analysis process conducted by the DCA. Where appropriate these have been aligned with the GASP, but the process has also identified local operational safety risks which have been considered.
- 1.5.2 Organisational Goals
 - a) Strengthen DCA safety oversight capability and ensure that an appropriate regulatory infrastructure is in place to support safe operations
 - b) Evolve and improve the SSP

- c) Provide safety information to ICAO by updating all relevant documents and records
 - d) Improve Communication and Coordination between Industry SMS
- 1.5.3 Operational Goals
- a) Reduce risk of runway incursions
 - b) Reduce and minimise impact of runway excursions
 - c) Manage risk of birdstrike
 - d) Manage risk of CFIT
- 1.5.4 The overall aim is to meet Gibraltar's Acceptable Level of Safety Performance of, **“no accidents involving commercial air transport that result in serious injuries or fatalities. No serious injuries or fatalities to third parties as a result of aviation activities.”**

1.6 General Operational Context

- 1.6.1 Gibraltar is a UK overseas territory at the southern point of the Iberian Peninsular across the Strait of Gibraltar from Morocco which is about 21km to the south. The frontier with Spain is 400m north of the runway with approximately 10,000 workers crossing on a daily basis, many of whom cross the runway on foot or cycle. The opening of a tunnel in 2023 has diverted road traffic away from the runway.
- 1.6.2 Gibraltar has a single airport which is divided into two parts. The runway and manoeuvring area are the responsibility of the UK MoD and the RAF Station Commander is the Aerodrome Authority. As a military airfield it is not certificated and the MAA regulate this aspect of the operation. The MAA regulations are based on ICAO Annex 14 requirements.
- 1.6.3 The air terminal and associated apron are the responsibility of the HMGoG. The air terminal processes approximately 450,000 passengers per year.
- 1.6.4 There are approximately 5000 aircraft movements per year, 80% of which are commercial air transport with two operators using A320's. The rest of the movements comprise military flights and a variety of general aviation of all sizes.
- 1.6.5 The airport is located on an isthmus at the northern end of the territory of Gibraltar approximately 300m north of the Rock of Gibraltar, this proximity, as well as the surrounding urban environment can cause turbulence to affect landings to either runway 09 or 27. Commercial air transport operators usually require that the approach and landing be flown by the Commander of the aircraft.
- 1.6.6 The runway is 1800m in length and 45m in width with a single parallel taxiway running half its length. There are three aprons, two military and one civilian, the latter having five designated stands. All movements are subject to an Air Traffic Service provided by the MoD but subject to DCA regulation and required to have an SMS.
- 1.6.7 The airspace in the vicinity of the airport in which ATS's are provided is a combination of class D, E and G and the airport is within the Seville TMA, ATS being coordinated through a letter of agreement between the Gibraltar Service Provider and Seville Control Centre. The airport has neither an ATZ nor a CTZ.
- 1.6.8 Runway 09 has a curved approach and arrivals to both runways remain over the sea at all times. ATC can provide SRA's to either runway; both runways are non-instrument

and require pilots to obtain visual reference by 3 nautical miles in order to continue to land.

- 1.6.9 There have been no accidents or serious incidents recorded at Gibraltar in the last three years, which is the monitoring period for the compilation and assessment of risk for this plan.
- 1.6.10 The DCA is designated by HMGoG to perform the civil aviation regulatory oversight required by the Civil Aviation Act 2009.

Chapter 2 Roles and Responsibilities

2.1.1 Everyone involved in the aviation industry has a role to play in safety and it is important that aviation stakeholders ensure that this message is delivered throughout their organisations. This NASP is designed to support this activity while supporting the evolution of the SSP.

2.1.2 The following key stakeholders with a specific responsibility for aviation safety have been identified:

- HMGoG
- DCA
- MAA
- RAF Gibraltar
- Air Terminal Manager
- Commercial Operators operating into Gibraltar Airport

2.1.3 HMGoG

2.1.3.1 The Minister with responsibility for Civil Aviation is broadly responsible for organising, carrying out and encouraging measures for the development of safety of civil aviation under the provisions of the Civil Aviation Act 2009.

2.1.3.2 HMGoG is responsible for ensuring that the DCA is reasonably funded in order to deliver its responsibilities.

2.1.4 DCA

2.1.4.1 The DCA has a responsibility to promote, develop and regulate safety in civil aviation in Gibraltar.

2.1.4.2 The DCA has a responsibility to perform the regulatory and oversight functions of Gibraltar in accordance with the principles of the Annexes of the Chicago Convention and any other international agreements.

2.1.4.3 The DCA is the Competent Authority for the applicable annexes of the Chicago Convention. It should be noted that for those annexes for which the DCA is not the Competent Authority, the MAA takes on this role.

2.1.4.4 The DCA has a responsibility to prepare, issue and amend operating regulations and procedures on aviation safety in accordance with the Annexes to the Chicago Convention.

2.1.4.5 The DCA has a responsibility to develop effective oversight and enforcement strategies and programmes to ensure compliance with aviation safety regulations.

2.1.4.6 The DCA has a responsibility to notify ICAO of any differences to Annexes and ensure that such significant differences are published in the Aeronautical Information Publication.

2.1.4.7 The DCA is responsible for the conduct of regular reviews of civil aviation safety to:

- a) Monitor the safety performance of the civil aviation industry
- b) Identify safety and safety related trends and risk factors
- c) Promote the improvement of the safety system

2.1.5 The MAA

2.1.5.1 The MAA regulate MoD infrastructure and safeguarding standards through the requirements detailed in the MAA Regulatory Publication. The criteria are broadly aligned with ICAO Annexes.

2.1.6 RAF Gibraltar

2.1.6.1 The Station Commander at RAF Gibraltar is the Aerodrome Authority and is responsible for oversight of activities affecting the MoD infrastructure including the safeguarding of the runway.

2.1.7 Air Terminal Manager

2.1.7.1 The Air Terminal Manager is responsible for the safety of operations on the civilian apron including refuelling and is responsible for Annex 14 compliance of the AFRS.

2.1.8 Commercial Aircraft Operators

2.1.8.1 The commercial aircraft operators operating into the airport are responsible for ensuring they comply with Gibraltar legislation and the requirements of their appropriate State of Operator.

Chapter 3 Purpose of the NASP

- 3.1 This is the master planning document containing the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety for the next three years, 2025 to 2028. This plan outlines the aviation safety issues, setting goals and targets, and presents a series of SEI's to address these.
- 3.2 Strategically the NASP intends to ensure aviation oversight activity is supported to the highest practicable level while encouraging transparency and managing specified operational risks identified through a robust risk assessment process.
- 3.3 This NASP has been developed using the international safety goals and targets and HRC's from the GASP, RASP and the UK NASP.

Chapter 4 Challenges and Priorities in Safety Planning

4.1 General

- 4.1.1 This chapter presents safety-related challenges and priorities that are deemed of concern to the Gibraltar aviation community. These challenges are derived from the analysis of safety data collected from proactive and reactive safety-related activities conducted by the DCA. The challenges identified are used to assist in defining priorities for action, which then serve as the basis for the development of the NASP goals and targets. The identification of safety-related challenges and the prioritization of areas that require action are key steps in the aviation safety planning process. Safety data used to identify challenges and define priorities includes, but is not limited to: incident investigations; safety reporting; inspections and audits; safety studies. This chapter provides background information on the goals and targets selected for the 2025–2028 edition of the NASP.
- 4.1.2 In preparing this document it was considered appropriate to conduct a SWOT analysis of the Office of the DCA as part of the process of informing the assessment process for selecting goals and targets. In the interests of transparency this analysis is published below.

Table 1 – DCA SWOT Analysis


<p>Strength</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Small size of jurisdiction and low complexity of aviation industry. 2. Agility in responding to developments. 3. Ability to reach back to the UK for expertise. 4. Governmental support for authority backed by strong legislative framework. 	<p>Weakness</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Small number of staff to manage areas of responsibility. 2. Shortage of on-site technical expertise. 3. Assuring local stakeholder support for the process of NASP development.
<p>Opportunity</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change from a Department of Government to an Authority is an opportunity to assess resource requirements and review functions in depth. 2. The above processes allow for a streamlining and clarification of regulation. 	<p>Threat</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Development of SSP/NASP in isolation could result in the documents lacking effectiveness. 2. Small size of jurisdiction and fact the only airport is operated by the UK MoD may lead to a lack of clarity between DCA and MAA on areas of responsibility.

4.2 Organisational Challenges

- 4.2.1 Organizational challenges are systemic issues, which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Organizations include the Office of the DCA, MoD and service providers.
- 4.2.2 Safety oversight is a function by means of which the DCA ensures effective implementation of the safety related SARPs and associated procedures contained in

the Annexes to the Convention. Safety oversight also ensures that the national aviation industry provides a safety level equal to, or better than, that defined by the SARPs. The DCA has overall safety oversight responsibilities for civilian aviation which emphasizes Gibraltar’s commitment to safety in respect of aviation activity. The eight critical elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system are presented in Figure 4-1. These are the elements adopted by Gibraltar in order to provide effective safety oversight and safety management.

Figure 4-1 Critical Elements of a State’s Safety Oversight System



4.2.3 Gibraltar works to continually improve its effective implementation of these eight CEs of the safety oversight system in all relevant areas, as appropriate to the complexity of the aviation system. This is achieved through direct resourcing of the DCA, seeking advice from other competent authorities and through collaboration with industry stakeholders.

4.3 Appropriate Infrastructure to Support Safe Operations

4.3.1 The DCA recognises the principles of the essential services outlined in the ICAO Basic Building Blocks framework as a foundation for safe and secure air activity, these essential services being aerodrome operations, air traffic management, search and rescue, meteorology and aeronautical publications. While the Office of the DCA is not directly responsible for oversight of all of these services, it will seek to achieve SARP

compliance for all those services for which it is responsible for oversight and for those services the oversight of which is the responsibility of the MAA, the DCA will ensure effective collaboration with the MAA for the safety of Civil Aviation.

4.3.2 In assessing the organisational challenges faced in Gibraltar a combination of factors were considered, including recognition of the risk introduced by changes, a review of extant responsibilities and how they were being discharged through legislation. A SWOT analysis of the organisation was conducted to assist in the identification of weaknesses; this was used to arrive at the set of goals considered to be the highest organisational priorities for improvement.

4.3.3 Within industry in Gibraltar there are several mature safety management systems in operation. While each system individually achieves the necessary compliances for regulatory oversight purposes, it has been identified that systemic risks can arise where there is a failure to communicate and coordinate safety activity occurring within one system which impacts other systems.

4.4 Operational Safety Risks

4.4.1 Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (for example, operation of an aircraft, airports or provision of air traffic control). Operational interactions between people and technology, as well as the operational context in which aviation activities are carried out, are taken into consideration to identify performance limitations and hazards. Operational safety risks are classified according to categories of occurrences, such as incidents or accidents, aligned with the aviation occurrence categories from the Commercial Aviation Safety Team / ICAO Common Taxonomy Team.

4.4.2 The NASP is intended to achieve and maintain the acceptable level of safety performance for Gibraltar of “no accidents involving commercial air transport that result in serious injuries or fatalities. No serious injuries or fatalities to third parties as a result of aviation activities.”

4.4.3 The NASP identifies a series of NSI that need to be addressed in order to mitigate risks and assist in achieving the acceptable level of safety performance. The types of occurrences considered to be NSI were selected based on a review of all of the safety data currently available to the DCA. This included reporting activity, oversight audits and proactive assessments by stakeholders, the data was then processed to identify hazards and consequent risks based on the frequency and severity of potential outcomes. The process also took into account the Global HRC’s published in the GASP to arrive at four NSI that were identified as being the most important for aviation safety in Gibraltar. The NSI for the 2025-2028 version of the NASP are:

- CFIT
- Runway Excursions
- Runway Incursions
- Birdstrike

4.4.4 Controlled Flight into Terrain

4.4.4.1 CFIT is an in-flight collision with terrain, water or obstacle without indication of loss of control. Accidents categorized as CFIT involve all instances where an aircraft is flown into terrain in a controlled manner, regardless of the crew's situational awareness. CFIT accidents involve many contributing factors, including: procedure design and documentation; pilot disorientation; and adverse weather. Despite the absence of CFIT accidents involving air transport, CFIT accidents often have catastrophic results when they occur, with very few, if any, survivors. Therefore, there is a high fatality risk associated with these events.

4.4.4.2 CFIT has been selected as an NSI for a combination of reasons.

- a) The location of the airport in an urban environment and the close proximity of the Rock have led, as of necessity, to a set of bespoke safeguarding principles. Constant development and the financial imperatives involved require careful assessment of all projects close to the airport to ensure OLS compliance and crane management.
- b) The development of new approach procedures, in particular GNSS approaches must take into account the topography of not only Gibraltar but the surrounding areas which are mountainous and may set limitations on what can be achieved.
- c) The lack of approach aids and the ambient lighting in the vicinity of the airport means all new developments and current structures need to be monitored to mitigate the risk of pilot disorientation and incorrect line up resulting in an aircraft coming into proximity with a structure.
- d) Gibraltar is located in a busy shipping area with marinas close by. Large vessels and yachts with tall masts constitute a CFIT risk.

4.4.5 Runway Safety Occurrences

4.4.5.1 The term "runway safety" describes a series of occurrence categories, including: abnormal runway contact; ground collision; runway excursion; runway incursion; loss of control on the ground; collision with obstacle(s); and undershoot/overshoot. During the assessment process it was determined that runway excursion and runway incursion were the NSI's that would be the focus of any mitigation.

4.4.5.2 A runway excursion is a veer off or overrun off the runway surface. The term "runway excursion" is a categorization of an accident or incident which occurs during either the take-off or landing phase. The excursion may be intentional or unintentional, for example the deliberate veer off to avoid a collision brought about by a runway incursion. Runway excursions involve many contributing factors, including unstable approaches and the condition of the runway.

4.4.5.3 While it was recognised during the assessment process that no runway excursions had occurred, the likely severity of outcome of such an occurrence, exacerbated by the fact that the runway is surrounded by sea, approaches can be affected by turbulence due to the proximity of high ground and buildings, the lack of a stop way and a reduced RESA determined that runway excursion should be considered an NSI.

4.4.5.4 A runway incursion is any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. Incursions produce an increased risk of collision for aircraft occupying the runway. When collisions occur outside the runway (for example, on a taxiway or on the apron), the aircraft and/or vehicles involved are usually travelling relatively slowly. However, when a collision occurs on the runway, at least one of the aircraft involved will often be travelling at considerable speed (high energy collisions), which increases the fatality risk. Runway incursions involve many contributing factors, including aerodrome design; pilot and air traffic controller workload; and use of non-standard phraseology.

4.4.5.5 There are several potential sources for runway incursions at Gibraltar; aircraft, vehicles, airport personnel and intruders, the latter aggravated by a public pedestrian and cycle lane, used by thousands of people daily, which bisects the runway. Several reports are received annually of unauthorised entries onto the runway, the vast majority occurring at times when there are no aircraft movements. There are however sufficient reports of incursions during aircraft movements from various sources (aircraft, vehicles and personnel) which, when combined with the potential severity of outcome have led to runway incursion being considered an NSI.

4.4.6 Birdstrike

4.4.6.1 A bird strike is defined as a collision between a bird and an aircraft which is in flight or on a take-off or landing roll. Bird Strike can be a significant threat to aircraft safety. For smaller aircraft, significant damage may be caused to the aircraft structure and all aircraft, especially jet-engine ones, are vulnerable to the loss of thrust which can follow the ingestion of birds into engine air intakes. Bird strikes may occur during any phase of flight, but are most likely during the take-off, initial climb, approach and landing phases due to the greater numbers of birds in flight at lower levels. Since most birds fly mainly during the day, most bird strikes occur in daylight hours.

4.4.6.2 Apart from the commercial cost of birdstrike it represents a clear risk to life, and this has been recognised at Gibraltar, where the particular nuisance species is the Yellow-Legged Herring Gull, a non-flocking species which weighs in excess of a kilogramme. The species is partially migratory, but there is a significant year-round population which nests in Gibraltar, attracted by safe sites on cliffs and high buildings and plentiful food supplies. The threat of birdstrike is most acute during the period where fledglings are present in large numbers from March until May. The aerodrome authority recognises this risk and takes numerous measures to mitigate and therefore the annual birdstrike rate averages around 5 a year. The potential for a serious incident occurring as a result of one of these events has led to its inclusion as an HRC.

Chapter 5 NASP Goals, Targets and Indicators

5.1 Organisational Goals

5.1.1 Summary of Organisational Goals

- Provide safety information to ICAO by updating all relevant documents and records
- Strengthen DCA safety oversight capability
- Implement an effective SSP
- Improve change management processes between airfield organisations

Goal 1 – Strengthen DCA Oversight Capability

Goal	Strengthen DCA Safety Oversight Capability		
ID	ORG1.1		
Stakeholders	DCA		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Establish a process for resource planning and allocation aligned with the requirements to conduct safety oversight	DCA	03/2026
	Establish a process for assessing changes in resource requirements	DCA	09/2026
	Fill 100% of posts necessary for the implementation of the oversight mandate.	DCA	03/2026
	Establish a corporate human resource plan to support hiring and retention of the appropriate number of qualified technical personnel	DCA	03/2026
	Establish a process for assessing the changing needs for qualified technical personnel	DCA	09/2026
Indicators	% of posts identified % of post filled Number of vacant posts		
GASP Reference	<p>SEI 4 – Strategic allocation of resources to enable effective safety oversight SEI 4B – Establish a process for the resource planning and allocation in alignment with the organisation structure of a competent authority which is required to conduct effective safety oversight. SEI 4D – Develop a process for assessing changing resource requirements and sustain necessary coordination with resource stakeholders for safety oversight improvements.</p> <p>SEI 5 – Qualified technical personnel to support effective safety oversight SEI 5A – Establish an effective system to identify and track qualifications and training of existing technical personnel. SEI 5B – Identify the gaps in qualified technical personnel and training requirements necessary to implement the oversight mandate. SEI 5E – Establish human resource plans to support hiring and retention of the appropriate number of qualified technical personnel required. SEI 5F – Implement training policies and programmes for technical personnel and verify that the type and frequency of training successfully completed are sufficient to acquire/maintain the required qualifications and level of competence corresponding to the assigned duties and responsibilities of technical personnel. SEI 5G – Develop a process for assessing changing needs of qualified technical personnel requirements and develop procedures to update hiring, retention and training personnel needs in coordination with SEI 4B.</p>		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI's, both pertinent to the resourcing of the DCA and together aimed to meet the goal to strengthen DCA safety oversight capability		

Goal	Strengthen DCA Safety Oversight Capability		
ID	ORG1.2		
Stakeholders	DCA		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Identify and complete review of all applicable Gibraltar legislation for compliance requirements	DCA	12/2025
	Ensure all data required from service providers by legislation is available to the DCA	DCA	03/2029
	Achieve 100% DCA compliance with all of Gibraltar legislation	DCA	12/2026

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	Introduce compliance monitoring process	DCA	12/2026
	Ensure technical personnel are supported by regulation and have all necessary material to carry out their oversight and enforcement functions	DCA	12/2025
Indicator	% of regulations reviewed % of identified compliance requirements achieved % compliance with ICAO SARPS		
GASP Reference	<p>SEI 1 – Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPS at the national level SEI 1B – Address all PQ’s of the USOAP CMA SEI 1E – Establish a process for the identification of differences with ICAO SARPS.</p> <p>SEI 2 – Develop a comprehensive regulatory oversight framework SEI 2B – Develop an effective system to promulgate technical guidance and tools, and provide safety critical information needed for technical personnel to effectively perform their safety oversight functions.</p> <p>SEI 9 – Continued implementation of and compliance with ICAO SARPS at the national level SEI 9A – Implement licensing, certification, authorization and approval process. SEI 9B – Implement regulatory oversight and enforcement process.</p>		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI’s, both pertinent to DCA oversight capability and together aimed to meet the goal to strengthen DCA safety oversight capability		

Goal 2 - Provide Safety Information to ICAO by Updating All Relevant Documents and Records

Goal	Provide safety information to ICAO by updating all relevant documents and records		
ID	ORG2.1		
Stakeholders	DCA		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	To complete 80% compliance as an aggregate of applicable compliance check list responses	DCA	12/2025
	To Complete 100% of applicable PQ responses and enter into USOAP	DCA	12/2025
	Complete 100% SAAQ responses	DCA	12/2025
	Complete 100% of EFOD	DCA	12/2025
	Maintain responses at 100% completion	DCA	12/2026
Indicators	% of targets completed % of completion in subsequent years		
GASP Reference	SEI 1 – Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at a national level SEI 1B – Address all PQ’s of the USOAP CMA SEI 7 – Provision of the primary source of safety information to ICAO by completing, submitting and updating all relevant documents and records SEI 7B – Complete and submit the self-assessment check list based on USOAP CMA PQs SEI 7C – Complete and submit the State Aviation Activity Questionnaire SEI 7D – Complete and submit the compliance checklist on EFOD system.		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI’s, both pertinent to the goal of providing safety data to ICAO		

Goal	Provide safety information to ICAO by updating all relevant documents and records		
ID	ORG2.2		
Stakeholders	DCA MAA		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Develop and publish Gibraltar AIP	DCA	06/2025
	Develop procedure for maintaining and updating AIP	DCA	12/2025
	Include 100% of significant differences from SARPs in AIP	DCA	12/2025
Indicators	AIP draft complete by 04/2025 % of targets complete.		
GASP Reference	SEI 7 – Provision of the primary source of information to ICO by completing, submitting and updating all relevant documents and records SEI 7E – Update documents and records, as required, in a timely manner.		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI’s, both pertinent to the goal of providing safety data to ICAO		

Goal 3 – Continue Implementation of an Effective State Safety Programme

Goal	Implement an effective state safety programme		
ID	ORG3.1		
Stakeholders	DCA MoD		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Identify all key stakeholders by target date	DCA	09/2025
	Establish SSP working group	DCA	12/2025
	Develop action plan to address the elements identified as deficient in SSP gap analysis	DCA	03/2026
	Work with stakeholders to complete actions in action plan to address the elements identified as deficient in SSP gap analysis	DCA	09/2026
Indicators	% of targets completed		
GASP Reference	SEI 15 – Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to start SSP implementation SEI 15B – Identify relevant key aviation stakeholders from relevant organisations domestically and internationally. SEI 15C – Develop an action plan to address the elements identified as missing or deficient during the SSP gap analysis.		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI, both pertinent to the goal of implementing an effective state safety programme		

Goal	Implement an effective state safety programme		
ID	ORG3.2		
Stakeholders	DCA MoD		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Ensure all SSP requirements are captured	DCA	09/2025
	Publish revised SSP	DCA	12/2025
	Conduct SSP awareness campaign	DCA	03/2026
	Establish a system for continuous improvement of the SSP in collaboration with stakeholders	DCA	12/2026
Indicators	% of targets completed		
GASP Reference	SEI 16 – Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation SEI 16A – Work with key aviation stakeholders to execute action plan for implementation. SEI 16B – Work with key aviation stakeholders on establishing and updating SSP elements. SEI 16C – Establish a system for the continuous improvement of the SSP in collaboration with all key aviation stakeholders.		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI, both pertinent to the goal of implementing an effective state safety programme		

Goal 4 – Improve Change Management Processes Between Airfield Organisations

Goal	Improve Change Management Processes between airfield organisations		
ID	ORG4		
Stakeholders	DCA MAA RAF Gibraltar Gibraltar Defence Police NATS Aquila AFRS Gibair		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Airfield organisation leads to establish stakeholder working group	MoD	09/2025
	Working group to develop aerodrome change management process agreed by all stakeholders	MoD	03/2026
	Education programme implemented to ensure all airfield organisations are aware of requirements of new process	MoD	09/2026
	Monitor implementation to establish effectiveness of new process and revise if required	MoD	12/2027
Indicators	% of targets completed by date Elimination of incidents where change management is a causal factor		
GASP Reference	Industry SEI 4 – Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner Industry SEI 8 – Availability of safety data and safety information to support safety SEI 12 – Advancement of safety risk management at the service provider level		
SEI Statement	The targets have been aligned with the SEI, both pertinent to the goal of improving change management processes between industry SMS's		

Operational Goals

5.1.2 Summary of Operational Goals

- Reduce number of runway incursions
- Mitigate against runway excursions
- Continue and improve management of birdstrike risk
- Continue and improve management of risk of CFIT

Goal 1 – Reduce Number of Runway Incursions

Goal	Reduce number of runway incursions		
ID	OPS1.1		
Stakeholders	MoD Gibraltar		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Ensure effective Runway Safety Team established with required attendees and terms of reference	DCA	09/2025
	Agree common definitions of runway safety events	DCA	03/2026
	Ensure Runway Safety team reviews and mitigates all runway safety events	DCA	03/2026
	Ensure effective aerodrome airside training	MoD	09/2026
	Ensure adherence to procedures and change management processes	DCA	12/2026
	Ensure aircraft operator awareness of risks through communication campaign	DCA	12/2026
Indicator	% reduction in runway incursions Minimum 80% attendance by required organisations at meetings % of targets completed		
GASP Reference - Industry	SEI State RI 1 SEI State RI 1a Ensure the establishment and implementation of a runway safety programme and runway safety team SEI State RI 1b Promote the establishment of policy, procedures and training that supports situational awareness for controllers, pilots and airside vehicles. SEI State RI 2 Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/incident investigations SEI State RI 4 Develop and implement further SEI's to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors for runway incursions SEI State RI 5 Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEI's		

Goal 2 – Mitigate Against Runway Excursions

Goal	Mitigate against runway excursions		
ID	OPS1.1		
Stakeholders	MoD Gibraltar		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Ensure effective Runway Safety Team established with required attendees and terms of reference	DCA	09/2025
	Agree common definitions of runway safety events	DCA	03/2026
	Ensure Runway Safety team reviews and mitigates all runway safety events	DCA	03/2026
	Ensure all aerodrome surfaces are managed to minimise excursion risk	MoD	06/2026
	Ensure aircraft operator awareness of risks through communication campaign	DCA	12/2026
Indicator	0 runway excursions Minimum 80% attendance by required organisations at meetings % of targets completed		
GASP Reference - Industry	SEI State RE 1 SEI State RE 1a Ensure the establishment and implementation of a runway safety programme and runway safety team SEI State RE 2 Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/incident investigations SEI State RE 4 Develop and implement further SEI's to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors for runway incursions SEI State RE 5 Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEI's		

Goal 3 - Continue and Improve Management of Birdstrike

Goal	Continue to improve management of birdstrike risk		
ID	OPS2.1		
Stakeholders	MoD Gibraltar NATS		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Ensure effective aerodrome wildlife management	MoD	06/2025
	Ensure operators aware of risk from birdstrike through promotion of risk	DCA	06/2025
	Continue and improve collaboration with off airfield agencies	DCA	09/2025
	Continue and improve collaboration with agencies outside Gibraltar	DCA	03/2027
Indicator	No increase in annual birdstrike rate No significant increase in bird count metric as reported by operator		
GASP Reference - Industry	NA		

Goal 4 – Continue to Improve Management of Risk of CFIT

Goal	Continue to Improve Management of risk of CFIT		
ID	OPS3.1		
Stakeholders	DCA MoD		
Target		Lead Agency	Completion
	Continue to support requirements for developers to adhere to OLS restrictions	DCA	06/2025
	Promotion through the marinas of risks posed to aircraft by vessels	DCA	09/2025
	Review all letters of agreement regarding maritime activity to ensure up to date and agree any necessary changes	MoD	12/2025
	Achieve complete understanding of any changes made to international standards of application of OLS	DCA	09/2027
	Introduce RNP-AR approach to both runways	DCA	12/2027
Indicator	No new infringements of OLS No occurrences involving terrain % of targets completed		
GASP Reference - Industry	SEI State CFIT 1 SEI State CFIT 1d Promote greater awareness of approach risks SEI State CFIT 4 Develop and implement further SEI's to mitigate the risk of the identified contributing factors for runway incursions SEI State CFIT 5 Conduct continuous evaluations of the performance of the SEI's		

Chapter 6 Emerging Safety Issues

6.1 Emerging issues include concepts of operations, technologies, public policies, business models or ideas that might impact safety in the future, for which insufficient data exists to complete typical data-driven analysis. Due to the lack of data, emerging issues cannot automatically be considered as operational safety risks. It is important that the DCA remains vigilant on emerging issues to identify hazards, collect relevant data and proactively develop mitigations to address any associated risks. The management of emerging issues, particularly by mitigating safety risks, can provide opportunities to foster innovation.

6.1.1 RPAS

6.1.1.1 The growth of the RPAS industry has been notable over the past three years and the variety of purpose for which RPAS are being used, even at a local level, is recognised. The concepts of operations and business models being presented to the DCA are a new challenge for regulation often in areas where there is insufficient international activity to allow a fall back to methods used elsewhere. The DCA wishes to encourage innovation in a growing sector while proceeding with caution to ensure that no unacceptable risks are introduced which could affect safety. The DCA will apply the safety management principles to the industry which will meet the second part of Gibraltar's acceptable level of risk, that there will be **"No serious injuries or fatalities to third parties as a result of aviation activities."** Monitoring of the industry and the management of new risks will be essential to meeting this target, but there is currently insufficient data to include RPAS as a specified risk within this plan.

Chapter 7 Safety Performance Measurement

- 7.1 The DCA will monitor the implementation of this plan and measure safety performance of the civil aviation system and any interfaces with that system.
- 7.2 The DCA will monitor the indicators within each goal of this plan to measure the safety performance of the civil aviation system and measure progress. The DCA will provide regular updates to stakeholders and require updates from them on the indicators for each target. The DCA will also provide relevant updates on this plan.
- 7.3 The NASP will be reviewed biannually and involve all stakeholders, progress will be assessed and any updates to the plan agreed. Updated plans will be circulated to stakeholders and published on the DCA web page.
- 7.4 If during the life cycle of this plan the DCA, or any stakeholder, identifies a new and critical risk to operational safety, any measure deemed reasonable will be taken to mitigate that risk as soon as practicable and an interim revision of this plan will be considered to capture that risk.
- 7.5 Where a target is not met the DCA will examine the reasons for this by identifying the root cause with further plans to address this. Target dates can only be amended with the permission of the DCA.

Chapter 8 Contact Details

8.1 For any information on this plan enquiries should be made via email to dca@gibraltar.gov.gi